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Stock exchanges play a vital role in any capitalist economy as they provide a secondary market where 
investors can buy and sell shares under orderly conditions at fair and competitive prices. This role 
requires stock exchange operations to be regulated in order to enhance the efficiency, transparency 
and full disclosure in their operations. This is particularly true with respect to the potential harm 
associated with insider trading. In Zimbabwe the trading of shares is conducted through Zimbabwe 
Stock Exchange and is regulated by the Zimbabwe Securities Commission. The Zimbabwean Stock 
Exchange is a typical emerging stock exchange whose performance has been noteworthy in the past 
two decades in terms of returns on investment in United States dollar terms and in terms of share price 
increases. In recent years however, the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange has faced some challenges 
associated with insider trading. On the other hand principles of corporate governance, business ethics 
and morality have been emphasized as critical managerial attributes that result in fair trading and 
business practices. Based on literature review on the subject and responses to qualitative interviews 
with stakeholder groups on insider trading in Zimbabwe, this paper discussed the concept of insider 
trading and its causes and proposes a framework for combating insider trading in developing stock 
exchanges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Stock exchanges play a vital role in any capitalist 
economy as they provide a secondary market where 
investors can buy and sell shares under orderly 
conditions at fair and competitive prices (Manne, 1966). 
This role requires stock exchange operations to be 
regulated in order to enhance efficiency, transparency 
and full disclosure in their operations. A well regulated 
stock exchange mitigates the potential harm associated 
with insider trading (Duan, 2009; Aktas et al., 2007; 
Battacharchya and Daouk, 2002).  
Zimbabwe has made significant progress in developing a 
legal framework that facilitates the orderly trading of 
securities. A closer look at the legislative and 
administrative system  of  trading  of  securities  however  
reveals that there are some inadequacies that require to 
be addressed to minimize loopholes that have potential 
harm to the market‟s ability to function effectively and 
efficiently. This paper discusses the subject of insider 
trading from a Zimbabwean (developing economy) 
perspective and proposes mechanisms that could be 
used to address the inadequacies of insider trading 
regulation currently in place. 
In Zimbabwe, the trading of shares is conducted 
through the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and is 
regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission of 
Zimbabwe as prescribed by the Securities Act Chapter 
(17 of 2004). The Zimbabwean Stock Exchange is a 
typical emerging stock exchange whose performance has  
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been noteworthy in the past two decades. In 2001, for 
example, the Standards and Poor survey voted the ZSE 
as the best performing emerging market both in terms of 
returns on investment in United States dollars and in 
terms of share price increases. In recent years however, 
the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange has faced some 
challenges associated with insider trading, (Kalonga, 
2003; Saburi, 2003; Nyakazema, 2008). For example, in 
2008,  the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Committee, 
investigated allegations of insider trading after certain 
counters‟ share prices were alleged to have been 
inflated, depressed and in some cases some share prices 
had fluctuated under suspicious circumstances 
(Nyakazema, 2008). On the other hand, principles of 
corporate governance, business ethics and moral 
imperatives have been emphasized as critical managerial 
attributes that result in fair trading and good business 
practices, (Newkirk and Robertson, 1998). Based on 
literature review on the subject and responses to 
qualitative interviews with stakeholder groups on insider 
trading in Zimbabwe, this paper discusses the concept of 
insider trading, its causes. It further proposes a 
framework for combating insider trading in developing 
stock markets. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Insider trading is a controversial subject internationally 
(Beny, 2008; Bris, 2005; Durnev and Nain, 2007; 
Chitimira, 2008). This subject still receives considerable 
attention in academic, policy circles and in the media 
fraternity (Kalonga, 2003; Saburi, 2003; Bainbridge, 
2010). Globally there is no consensus on a definition of 
insider trading (Newkirk and Robertson, 1998; 
Bainbridge, 1999).  Literature points to two approaches to 
defining insider trading. The first approach assigns 
property rights to insider information advocating that the 
shareholders have a property interest in the information 
held by the company (Bainbridge, 2007; Hogan, 1989; 
Goshen and Parchomovsky, 2001).  According to 
Bainbridge (1999) law and economics scholars, mostly 
favour this approach as they contends that the property 
right to inside information should be assigned to the 
corporation and not subject to contractual reassignment. 
Under this approach, insider trading is defined as the use 
of information not publicly available, by a participant in a 
securities transaction whose access to that information is 
derived directly or indirectly from a fiduciary relationship, 
which gives the participant or associate a financial 
advantage over others (Dooley, 1980; Sudhakar, 2004). 
The financial advantage mentioned may be secured from 
trading in securities of the company in which the fiduciary 
relationship is established or in other companies whose 
market values may be influenced if confidential 
information held by the initial company is acted  upon. In 
 the  latter  case,  this  is  most  commonly  expressed in  
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mergers and takeovers. 
The second approach, which Hogan (1989) describes, 
emphasizes equality of access to information about a 
company by all participants in a securities market and 
sets aside the property concept. With this approach, the 
definition of insider trading relates to the use of 
information, not publicly available, by a participant in a 
securities transaction to his financial advantage at the 
expense over other participants without access to similar 
information. Under the second approach, emphasis is 
placed on fairness by participants and trust in the trading 
system of securities, (Newkirk and Robertson, 1998; 
Bainbridge, 1999). 
Beny (2008) arguing from a political economy 
perspective, points out that when insider trading is 
unregulated, by default, the state assigns the property 
rights to private capital information to corporate insiders, 
enabling them to maximise their private rents from the 
use of such information. Further, Beny (2008) adds that 
when insider trading is prohibited, the state removes 
insiders‟ monopoly on the use of private corporate 
information and thus redistributes rent to outsiders. 
In Zimbabwe, Part X of the Securities Act (2004) 
identifies directors, advisers, consultants and 
shareholders or an issuer of listed securities as insiders. 
The act prohibits such individuals who know or ought to 
know from trading or dealing directly or indirectly in any 
affected security or from misuse of inside information. 
The term outsiders as it applies to insider traders, relates 
to all other stakeholders other than insiders (as defined 
before). These include informed traders (arbitrage 
traders) such as market professionals, market analysts, 
brokers, dealers and individual investors. This term can 
also be applied to institutional investors such as pension 
funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, index traders 
and foreign investors.  
In a bid to try and curb the negative effects of insider 
trading activities, many economies have promulgated 
insider trading laws as mechanisms for minimizing illegal 
insider trading. The United States of America (USA) has 
since 1934 been in the forefront in terms of developing 
legislature to govern insider trading (Newkirk and 
Robertson, 1998).  Sudhakar (2004) suggests that it is 
critical that legislation should reflect both approaches 
described by Hogan (1989) in order to allow the true 
nature of the wrong elements perpetrated by the offence 
of insider trading to be clearly outlined. It would be ideal 
that the legislation dealing with insider trading also 
incorporates features of the second approach with 
regards to the disclosure requirements imposed on listed 
companies. In essence, legislation will therefore, be in a 
position that to encapsulate both definitive approaches. 
This notion aims at ensuring an all encompassing 
approach to the definition which will ensure that there are 
no loopholes left for technical abuse by securities market 
and legal experts. 
Beny (2002)  states  that  insider trading is synonymous 
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with financial greed and wheeler dealing. In academia 
and policy circles, the debate centers on the desirability 
of regulating insider trading. Advocates of insider trading 
regulation (Barlev and Haddad, 2010; Fernandes and 
Ferreira, 2009), state that the objective of insider trading 
laws is to reduce the information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders which ultimately enhances 
efficiency. Opponents of insider trading laws on the other 
hand, claim that such legislation favours special interest 
groups at the expense of efficiency (Beny, 2002). On an 
international scale, with a few exceptions, insider trading 
legislation and enforcement are a phenomenon of the 
1990s. 
It must be stressed that the whole notion of making 
insider trading an offence stems from the well-known 
company law principle that directors owe a fiduciary duty 
to the company not to make a secret profit and further, 
the equitable notion that a director must not be allowed to 
put himself in a position in which his fiduciary duty and 
personal interests conflict (Bainbridge, 1995). It should be 
noted that there is an ethical duty for insiders to observe 
high standards of commercial integrity. This, in turn, 
would create confidence in the securities market, thus 
leading to the development of any stock exchange where 
securities can be traded with greater confidence and 
efficiency, hence creating the potential for increased 
foreign investment. 
 
 
Insiders and their associates  
 
Corporate insiders consist of traditional or „primary‟ 
insiders, including executives, board members, officers 
and controlling shareholders. Their status gives them 
privileged access to corporate information and thus a 
potential trading advantage relative to outsiders. 
There are also „constructive‟ or secondary insiders. 
These include lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, 
brokers and dealers, “…who may be privy to private 
information by virtue of a contractual relationship with the 
firm or its shareholders. To the extent that they receive 
private information (that is, information unavailable to the 
rest of the investing public) “from insiders, relatives, 
personal and political associates of insiders might be 
classified as insiders (Beny, 2002). 
From the aforementioned definition, inference can be 
made to the effect that an insider is a person in 
possession of specific information, which relates to 
securities of a firm which is not generally known but 
which if made public, would likely have a significant effect 
on the market price of those securities. An insider will try 
to buy or sell or suggest that others (tippees) buy or sell 
securities when he is in possession of information that 
may alter the price. The insider will do so before the 
information has been made to others in the investing 
community. 
Jeng et al. (2003)  suggest  that  primary insiders make 
 
 
 
 
superior profits (relative to the market) when they trade 
on the basis of insider information, which is not available 
to the public domain. Jeng et al. (2003) also applied 
performance evaluation techniques to reported United 
States insider transaction over 1975 to 1996 and found 
that a constructed portfolio of insiders‟ (top executives 
and other insiders) purchases over the previous year, 
earned abnormal returns of approximately forty basis 
points per month. Most professionals like brokers, 
dealers, investment bankers and institutional investors 
might also benefit from insider trading due to the special 
relationship they have established with corporations and 
management (Goshen and Parchomovsky, 2001). 
Insider trading on the basis of material, non-public 
information is undoubtedly even more profitable in 
countries where there are fewer legal constraints on 
insiders‟ self-dealing. Tippees clearly gain when they 
trade on the basis of private information received from 
insiders. Beny (2002) argues that in several countries, “… 
much insider trading is done by politicians and 
government bureaucrats who receive private information 
in exchange for economic or political favours.” Beny 
(2002) argument was empirically tested by Bris (2005) 
who presented international evidence suggesting that 
insider trading on the basis of private information is highly 
profitable in the context of corporate takeovers. 
 
 
Legal and illegal insider trading 
 
Legal insider trading occurs when insiders (officers, 
directors and employees) buy and sell stocks in their own 
companies (Kalonga, 2003). Their conduct can only 
become illegal and restricted at certain times and under 
specified conditions. On the other hand, “Illegal insider 
trading is the buying and selling of securities while one is 
in possession of privileged and confidential information, 
which is not available to the general public” (Kalonga, 
2003). This research will be dealing with illegal insider 
trading and not the former. Whenever illegal insider 
trading occurs, the perpetrators or those who practice 
insider trading would have gained an unfair advantage 
over everyone else and could earn super profits from 
trading on shares. 
The ideal scenario would be one where on one hand 
insiders can buy and sell shares in their companies at 
any time provided that the information they have is more 
or less the same as that of everyone else in the market. 
On the other hand insiders would not be allowed to buy 
or sell shares when they have price sensitive information 
such as of the contents of financial statements just prior 
to their publication or when they have confidential 
information of an intended merger, acquisition or any 
important piece of information that has a bearing on the 
share price.  
Some companies have policies for rewarding their 
employees and company executives with shares whereby  
they  are  given  options  to   purchase   company  shares 
 
 
 
 
under special arrangements. A company for example, 
may provide them with funds to buy shares at a huge 
discount to the market price. In such cases, a larger 
percentage of insiders will most likely take up the option, 
thereby participating in the buying and selling of their 
company‟s shares. 
In some instances, some individuals are expected to 
hold a certain quota of the company‟s shares when they 
qualify as directors. From the aforementioned examples, 
after accumulating sizeable chunks of the company‟s 
securities, insiders are allowed to sell their shares and 
diversify into other counters if they so wish. This is legal 
and does not constitute illegal insider trading if conducted 
in a transparent way and not induced by price sensitive 
insider information. 
Illegal insider trading is however not limited to company 
employees only. One can also be entangled in this illegal 
dealing business through getting a tip from someone with 
privileged information. A typical example could be that an 
employee of a company can pass on confidential 
information of his company to members of his family, 
friends or other associates. If these tippees decide to act 
on particular securities based on the information so 
supplied, either to buy or sell securities, then they will be 
guilty of practicing insider trading. 
In many cases, it is usually difficult to prove that a third 
party may be involved in inside trading. An example that 
comes to mind on this aspect is that of an investor who 
gets a tip from a broker with inside information relating to 
a particular security. The investor may be aware that he 
is acting on inside information but this will be very difficult 
to prove or establish in a court of law. 
Insider trading can also take the form of “… 
overhearing some confidential information about a 
company being discussed by other people directly 
involved with the company. Where a counter is 
concerned, if a person or an investor decides to act on 
the basis of the information they overhead, then that 
person could be involved in illegal insider dealing. On the 
other hand, the other parties may not be responsible for 
disseminating confidential information but will be liable to 
being careless where confidential matters are concerned 
(Prevention of Financial Markets Abuse Act, 2002, 
Chapter 476, Republic of Malta). 
The aforementioned analysis has given the general 
world‟s view of what insider trading is. However, as has 
been mentioned before, for the purpose of this research, 
whenever insider trading is mentioned, it means illegal 
insider trading. In this regard, insider trading can be seen 
as the misuse of price sensitive information by a 
corporate insider in order for him and/or his tippees to 
obtain an unfair advantage for himself or themselves in 
the market for securities of the corporation. It is an 
unethical practice that is motivated by greed on the part 
of perpetrators which in turn leads to the distortion of the 
operations of a securities market. Insider trading 
breaches  the  fiduciary  obligation  and trust that insiders 
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would have been bestowed by the corporation, in 
particular, and by the public eye, in general. 
Taking a snapshot of the international picture on insider 
trading regulations, the provisions to regulate dealings in 
a company‟s shares emerged because of widespread 
concerns about the misuse of confidential information by 
officers of the company, in particular, and also by their 
associates, their families and friends to whom they had 
relayed information about the company‟s shares. 
Regulation, on the other hand, has also sought to prevent 
misuse by others outside the company, such as 
accountants, auditors and bankers who might equally 
have access to restricted information about the company, 
which might affect the value of its shares on the market. 
 
 
The effects of insider trading 
 
When dealing with insider trading it is necessary to 
understand the extent and effects of insider trading on 
the market, on an individual and on the international 
reputation of the stock market in question. Insider trading 
is most harmful to the market. The harm, according to 
some brokers in its simplest form of insider trading, 
dislodges the market (Newkirk and Robertson, 1998; 
Bainbridge, 1999). 
Stock market prices act as signals for resource 
allocation, which help investors to make economic 
decisions as to where they should allocate their 
resources. “The harm” to international investors is 
significant as the investors constitute an avenue through 
which a country gains foreign currency injections. 
International investors tend to shun markets that have a 
reputation of allowing insider trading. This has a negative 
impact on issues of national economy. 
Insider trading is a form of stealing which, in turn, 
damages the share trading system. Investors “miss out 
on value and the vast majority of shareholders suffer” 
because “they should be able to share profits (Bris, 
2005). Manne (1966) argues that insider trading acts as a 
price accelerator and brings the price of securities to their 
proper level more quickly than would otherwise be the 
case.  He further goes on to argue that insider trading is 
beneficial because it provides an additional incentive to 
management to be more entrepreneurial in running the 
companies they control. 
Bushman et al. (2005) summarise the effects of insider 
trading as follows: investor confidence is eroded; the 
raising of capital is made more difficult; the efficiency of 
the market is destroyed; the perception of unfairness 
leads to disinvestments by both local and international 
investors; insider trading has the effect of corrupting or 
debasing the market; the international reputation of the 
stock exchange suffers and insider trading causes a 
reduction of direct foreign investment. 
There are several propositions that have been tabled in 
literature that seek to guide the manner in which stock 
markets  must   govern   insider   trading. These   can  be 
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grouped into two major parts, those that are against 
legislating insider trading and those that are promote 
legislating insider trading. 
 
 
The insider trading regulatory school 
 
The arguments in favour of regulating insider trading can 
be separated into one set sounding in economic terms 
and a second set premised on fairness, equity, and other 
non-efficiency grounds (Bainbridge, 2001: 70). Such 
scholars as Bushman et al. (2005), Newkirk and 
Robertson (1998),  Bainbridge (2001, 2010) and many 
others, believe that insider trading is immoral and defeats 
the objectives of good corporate governance. They argue 
that the use of privileged information for the purposes of 
gain (or to avoid a loss) at the expense of others is 
morally and legally reprehensible and as such should be 
regulated. They are of the view that a legal system, with 
specific laws, is the best way of protecting investors 
engaged in securities transactions and assuring public 
confidence in the integrity of the securities markets 
 
 
The insider trading deregulatory school 
 
The deregulation school posits four major theoretic 
arguments are raised. First based on the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH), the proponents favouring deregulating 
insider trading argue that markets react to information in 
their price determination role. Allowing insider trading will 
reduce the time information travels from the time it is 
generated to the time it is made public to the rest of the 
investing community (Manne, 1966). Further the 
argument for insider trading as vehicle for market 
efficiency advances the notion that once an insider trades 
on the basis of insider information, then the insider has 
practically disclosed the information and as such have 
allowed the market to move to a state of equilibrium or 
efficiency. 
Secondly some argue that insider trading is a legitimate 
form of compensation for corporate employee (Newkirk 
and Robertson, 1998; Manne, 1966; Dye, 1984; Carlton 
and Fischel, 1983). Carlton and Fischel (1983) argue 
against regulating insider trading. They argue that 
enacting laws that prohibit insider trading does not 
creates an uneven playing field only a  more costly one 
as outsiders interested in the inside information may 
obtain the information in a more costly manner than the 
insiders. Rather than viewing insider trading as a 
problem, Carlton and Fischel (1983) view it as a means 
of conveying the value of the firm‟s stock continuously 
and reliably. In a nutshell, the allocation of this 
“intellectual” property right to the managers is optimal. 
Critiquing this argument, Newkirk and Robertson (1998) 
state that this argument “fails to address the real and 
significant  hazard  of  creating  an incentive for corporate  
 
 
 
 
insiders to enter into risky or ill-advised ventures for short 
term personal gains, as well as to put off public release of 
important corporate information so that they can capture 
the economic fruits at the expense of shareholders” 
(Black, 1992). 
Thirdly it is also argued that insider trading regulations 
is against the work of analysts or market researchers who 
diligently seek for any information that might help their 
clients beat the market. After all, profits can only be 
appropriated when someone has better information than 
others. Empirical evidence from international securities 
markets in the United State of America for example, show 
that it is possible for analysts to conduct their business 
within the ambits of the law (Newkirk and Robertson, 
1998; Bainbridge, 2010). 
Lastly there is yet an argument that focuses on the cost 
of enforcing insider trading. The proponents of 
deregulation argue that it is simply not cost effective to 
regulate and enforce insider trading regulations. They 
argue that the money and human capital spent on 
investigating and prosecuting insider trading far out 
weights the benefits that may accrue. Other  even argue 
that such cost fall back on the transaction costs 
associated with trading on shares as investors pay some 
form of tax or levy to the enforcing authorities. This 
argument however has been rejected on the basis that it 
takes a myopic perspective to the cost element as it 
focuses only on direct costs that can be traced to 
enforcing agents and related areas and negates the 
external costs such as the costs that results from a 
perspective that insider trading is unchecked. 
Given the aforementioned debate, stock exchanges 
should therefore strive to have the best protection for 
investors and the public through the efficient operation of 
the capital market. This cannot be underestimated in 
developing economies where stock markets play a critical 
role in attracting foreign direct investment (Priotroski and 
Smith, 2005). The ideal situation, in mind, results in an 
efficiently developed market where investors can be 
confident that the market price accurately reflects a 
company‟s prospects, which ensures the efficient 
allocation of capital within the market.  The 
aforementioned scenario is only achieved when there is 
no insider trading and there are mechanisms for 
discouraging it. 
This study advances the theoretic notions shared by 
scholars who argue that insider trading must be regulated 
(Bushman et al., 2005; Newkirk and Robertson, 1998; 
Bainbridge, 2010). The study focuses on six propositions 
related to legislation, institutional structures, guidance to 
individuals, firm specific efforts, use of technology and 
the use of international lessons.  
 
 
Research propositions 
 
Based  on  the  earlier  discussion, this study investigates 
 
 
 
 
the following six propositions: 
 
1. Legislating insider trading minimize insider trading 
2. Institutional structures dealing with insider trading 
minimize insider trading 
3. Technology interventions minimize insider trading 
4. Individual support/guidance to persons working in 
insider trading environments minimize insider trading 
5. Institutional/firm specific support/guidance minimizes 
insider trading  
6. Utilising international lessons in developing insider 
trading structures minimises insider trading  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
An exploratory-descriptive study was adopted to inform the findings 
of this research. This study utilised qualitative empirical data 
collection methods to collect data to inform the proposed framework 
for combating insider trading in developing stock exchange. Primary 
data was collected through in-depth interviews. Stock brokers, 
members of the ZSE, ZSE officials, members of the Securities 
Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe (SECZ) and representatives of 
stakeholder institutions such as the Institute of Directors and the 
Zimbabwe Institute of Management were invited to participate in a 
voluntary interview process. Targeted interviewees were contacted 
telephonically, via email or through the snowball techniques after a 
responded either referred or introduced the research team to them. 
In total 53 in-depth interviews spanning across all stakeholder 
groups on insider trading in Zimbabwe were recorded and used in 
this research. After collecting 53 interviews the responses obtained 
from interviewees were more or less the same and the data 
collection process was stopped. Additional data was collected from 
official historical data available online relating to the ZSE, SECZ, 
companies listed on the ZSE and commentaries from newspapers 
and academics were utilised. Lastly the research also utilised the 
published information and pieces of legislation from Zimbabwe, the 
USA, the UK, Malta and South Africa. The responses to the various 
questions from the interviews together with the information from 
published sources and from beyond the borders of Zimbabwe were 
collated and triangulated and used to inform the findings presented 
in this paper. The research analysed each interview using 
predetermined themes from literature and other published sources. 
As each interview was analysed, peculiar themes identifiable to 
Zimbabwe and developing stock exchanges that emerged were 
added to the predetermined themes. After completing the analysis, 
a first draft of the findings compiled was sent to the major 
stakeholders for their comments. Feedback from 30 original 
respondents was incorporated into this final version. 
 
 
FINDINGS  
 
Causes of insider trading 
 
Based on the analysis of the qualitative interview and 
from historical data analysis, this research identified three 
broad areas as causes of insider trading at the ZSE. 
 
 
Under legislation of insider trading 
 
Insider  trading  is  illegal  in  Zimbabwe.  The   Securities 
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Act Chapter (2004) provides regulations on insider 
trading that covers both individuals and institutions that 
regulates or is affected by insider trading. The Act 
established the Securities Commission, a new institution 
in the Zimbabwean regulatory landscape, to undertake 
the overall role of managing insider trading. Part X of the 
Act concentrates on the misuse of insider information. 
The Act defines insider trading and insiders. It also 
prohibits against the misuse of insider information and 
ascribes both criminal and civil penalties to perpetrators. 
The regulation allows for a maximum of 5 years and or a 
fine for criminal offences emanating from insider trading 
activities. In terms of civil liabilities, the Zimbabwe 
Securities Commission, the issuer of securities and 
holders of securities, are allowed to seek for civil 
remedies through the courts. The Class Action Act (10 of 
1999) allows for a group of persons such as shareholders 
through their own action or through the Attorney General 
to institute criminal or civil action against perpetrators of 
insider trading. While an attempt to regulate insider 
trading have been made through legislation, there is still 
room for improvement. The regulation is currently 
contained within the Securities Act. This Act covers a 
wide variety of legislative provisions. The ideal scenario 
would be to have a standalone act that covers all areas of 
insider trading activities from compliance, minimisation 
mechanisms, penalties and enforcement activities. 
Further the law does not clearly give guidelines to the 
SECZ on exactly what it has to do to minimize insider 
trading. A lot of room is left to the commission to do what 
it sees fit in regulating the trading of securities. In the 
USA for example, the securities commission provides 
clear guidelines to all stakeholder on what they have to 
do to comply with the legislative arrangements. The 
commission literary manages a number of related acts. In 
South Africa, the Financial Service Board is guided by a 
comprehensive Act on Securities.  A total of 80% of the 
respondents indicated that the lack of detailed legislation 
to govern insider trading allowed individuals and other 
corporate institutions to attempt insider trading on price 
sensitive information.   
 
 
Lack of institutional structures to deal with insider 
trading 
 
On the international front, well-developed stock 
exchanges have their operations reinforced by other state 
and private institutions. There are insufficient institutional 
structures to deal with insider trading in Zimbabwe. The 
problem is compounded by poor participation in the 
operations of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange by the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, limited experience of the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Committee and the Securities 
Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe in determining 
insider trading offences, non-participation by specialised 
police fraud section and a non existence of an economic 
crimes court  in the Zimbabwean legal structures. What is 
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lacking is an all-encompassing policy framework 
incorporating the ZSE, the legislature, state-controlled 
regulatory institutions and law enforcement agencies to 
deal with insider trading. The Act alluded to in the 
preceding paragraph would allow for such coordinated 
efforts to combat insider trading. 
 
 
Limited firm specific guidelines to individual 
behaviour with respect to insider trading  
 
A survey of all firms listed on the ZSE indicated that out 
of the 72 firms listed, only 5  (6.9%) had some form of  
policy on insider trading and only one firm had its policy 
well documented on the company website on the internet. 
The unavailability of and the limitations in policy 
frameworks to guide individuals within firms, points to a 
deficiency that can be managed from a micro-firm 
perspective. A micro to macro perspective to the 
management of insider trading is essential as it reinforces 
the elimination process from all levels. Individual at firm 
level will have firm defined boundaries sanctions and 
guidelines on how they are expected to deal with insider 
trading. Clear well defined legislation supported by state 
and ancillary institutions will then add the macro 
perspective to the micro perspective at firm level. 
 
 
Other causes 
 
The other causes of insider trading in Zimbabwe include 
the following: 
 
 
Poor investor education  
 
There is limited investor education particularly in the area 
of governance and fair trading practices. An examination 
of the ZSE, the SECZ and other related institutions such 
as Universities, corporate bodies and support institutions 
such as the Institute of Directors shows that these 
ancillary institutions have limited role in educating the 
investor community on insider trading and its implications 
to the market and on the statutory provisions in place.  
 
 
Poor technology utilisation  
 
To date the ZSE and the Securities Exchange 
Commission utilises minimal technology in managing the 
trading, information dissemination and educational role. 
Technology has taken over the administration and 
implementation of this role particularly with the rise of the 
internet as a medium for information dissemination and 
real time trading. Real time information dissemination 
systems, online banking, transfer systems and stock 
market   activity   system   are   the   much   desired   and  
 
 
 
 
preferred systems today as they allow for mass 
broadcast of information; real time  trading and  real time 
funds transfer between trading parties. Technology also 
benefits in shareholder information updating. In addition 
to the non existence of an online trading system, a 
notable challenge that affects the efficiency of the ZSE is 
the non – existence of a central depository system. A 
central depository system would allow for the electronic 
settlement of financial transactions within Zimbabwe and 
across other securities exchanges and economies 
globally. In 2002, the Real Time Gross Settlement system 
was introduced in Zimbabwe, pioneering a new era for 
settlement of funds across financial institution and 
between individuals. In the USA systems such as the 
EDGAR system allows for listed companies to transmit 
information to the Securities Exchange Commission 
within the allowed time frames. Such systems have 
reduced the incidences of insider trading. 
 
 
The use of brokers as intermediaries in dealing in 
shares  
 
Individuals in Zimbabwe may not approach the stock 
exchange for purposes of trading on any shares. This is 
done by registered stock brokers, who are usually linked 
to a specific stock broking firm. There are 20 stock 
brokering firms in Zimbabwe of which there are more 
than 50 registered stock brokers. The use of brokers in 
the trading of shares creates a gap that is problematic 
with respect to share trading. Respondents pointed out 
that when an individual wants to trade in shares, he/she 
would approach a stockbrokerage firm. The firm would 
then request the investor to deposit the amount of money 
into their share trading bank account. Shares are only 
traded once the money deposited reflects in the stock 
brokerage firm‟s trading account. In some cases, 
individuals pointed out that it could take as many as 7 to 
14 days to trade on shares. During this period, a 
stockbrokerage firm would have “access” to the investors‟ 
funds allowing for possible “misuse” of the funds even for 
insider trading. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been demonstrated in this study that insider trading 
poses a serious challenge to good corporate governance 
and to the efficiency of developing stock and undermines 
the capital allocation role of a stock market. Developing 
economies require efficient markets to attract foreign 
direct markets. The framework developed earlier allows 
developing stock markets to develop acceptable 
institutions to support the minimising of the insider 
trading. In particular the study highlighted the need for a 
micro perspective to the combating of insider trading in 
developing  stock  markets.  Lastly the research identified  
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Figure 1. The individual, institutional insider trading minimisation framework. 
 
 
 
the development of a framework for company specific 
insider dealing as an area that requires more empirical 
investigation.  
 
 
Managerial implications 
 
Based on the earlier discussion in relation to the 
Zimbabwe Stock exchange, this paper identifies five 
critical elements that can be used to manage insider 
trading on any developing stock exchange. Figure 1 
summarised these main components into a proposed 
individual, Institutional insider trading minimisation 
framework for combating insider trading on developing 
stock exchanges. 
Perpetrators of insider trading are individuals, therefore 
any initiative to minimize insider trading ultimately should 
end up influencing the individual to act against any 
insider trading activities he may be inclined to engage 
into. The aforementioned theoretical framework proposes 
that insider trading can be minimized through the use of 
two main mechanisms that are directed towards 
individuals through micro (individual firm specific efforts) 
and macro (institutional dependent efforts). These 
initiatives would be generally driven by a robust 
legislative framework, state of the art technology and be 
influenced by lessons from the international community. 
This all encompassing framework should never be an 
event but a process that is periodically reviewed by 
stakeholders and improved upon. 
The framework proposes that firms should embark on 
individual  specific  efforts  such  as   training   aimed   at 
developing an individual‟s capabilities to act in a morally 
sound, ethical and honest way when dealing with stock 
market instruments. Induction courses, organisational 
handbooks, refresher courses, company policies and 
periodic reminders should be key governance enhancing 
activities that firms use to enhance positive insider 
trading behaviour. Respondents indicated that this might 
not be easy to achieve because of the growth in greed 
and dishonesty, but they acknowledged that individuals 
who are trained are most likely to be inclined to work in a 
morally correct way. Organisations therefore should 
invest in the training of staff to enhance their 
understanding of the impact of acting in any manner that 
could perpetrate insider trading. Such training should 
highlight the company specific guidelines on insider 
trading, legal elements of insider trading and the 
consequences of insider trading on the individual, firm 
and the economy at large. 
Further the framework proposes that the challenges 
associated with insider trading can be minimized by 
developing clear insider trading regulations and control 
mechanism. Both civil and criminal elements of insider 
trading must be clearly highlighted at law. The legislative 
provision must be enhanced through control and 
supervisory mechanism that allow for the use of systems 
and other infrastructures to be used to check the 
effectiveness of the regulatory framework. We note the 
success of using the EDGAR system in the United States 
of America as a typical influential example. Other 
countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Australia have also exhibited similar 
successes  through   the  use  of  technology. Developing 
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economies have argued that technology is costly and 
they tend to face challenges with implementing modern 
technology. We dismiss this rather limited view and argue 
that strategies to enhance political and economic ties 
have been developed in the past 60 years amongst 
developing economies. With developments in technology 
and the political and economic ties in place, we suggest 
that developing economies are able to acquire and share 
technology and systems to enhance stock market 
activities. 
Added to the technology is the supervisory role played 
by regulatory institutions. To supervise insider trading 
activities, calls for primary regulatory institutions such as 
securities commissions, stock exchange insider trading 
supervisory committees, central bank financial institution 
supervisory units and dedicated legal specialised courts 
such as commercial courts to develop expertise that are 
capable of supervising and providing the necessary 
regulatory guidelines and reports. Having regulatory 
institutions is one thing but having effective regulatory 
institutions is another. We propose that regulatory and 
supervisory institutions should regularly provide reports 
and statistics that communicate their mandates. This will 
enhance access to information and argument research 
on insider trading and other related regulatory activities. 
The development of legislation and system of 
enforcement should take lessons from international 
enforcement. Such foresight will allow the incorporation 
of modern practices that have been developed in some 
economies over the year. The case in point is the 
American system of insider trading which has evolved to 
the current levels where investors are confident of the 
mechanisms in place to protect their wealth. Significant to 
the use of international lessons is the consideration of the 
local circumstances. In most developing stock markets, 
the economies are also in their developmental phases. 
This requires that governments invest significant funds in 
developing infrastructure and capacity to bring their 
financial services and securities markets to world class 
standards.  
To complement the primary institutions, the 
aforementioned discussion also singled out the role of 
ancillary institutions in minimizing insider trading. 
Institutions that are influential and are highly regarded by 
the business community and whose mission clearly 
indicate objectives that seek to promote high levels of 
corporate governance are better placed to use their 
network to influence their members. 
Lastly, the debates around insider trading have mainly 
focused on the macro perspectives in particular the 
legislation aspect. This paper suggests that an equally 
important aspect to the minimization initiatives is the 
need for the micro perspective that focuses on the firm 
specific initiatives. Firm specific activities will approach 
the problem at root level an approach that allows 
individuals and management within a firm to micro 
manage the problem. An individual insider trading and 
ethical  behaviour  frame  work  driven  by  firm  initiatives 
 
 
 
 
through clear policy development is likely to be more 
successful than one that comes from beyond the firm 
though legislation. This paper submits that this view must 
be compounded by development of empirically grounded 
policy frameworks that will help managers develop local 
initiatives to the minimisation of insider trading. This 
paper highlighted the importance of the judiciary system 
in minimizing insider trading, the challenge associated 
with this method lies in its cost as it is dependent upon 
legal experts and their abilities to argue for and against 
technicalities that may be abused within the confirms of 
the legal structures in place. The individual perspective 
allows for the use of local instruments that are cost 
effective in minimizing insider trading. The paper also 
asserts that the use of individual support mechanisms 
has overall benefits to economies at it allows for the stock 
market to become efficient at the least cost. This is a 
desirable state as it attracts foreign direct investment, to 
the stock market as compared to inefficient markets 
which results in firms having to acquire capital at higher 
costs.   
 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This paper has proposed a framework that can be used 
to by developing stock exchanges to minimize insider 
trading. In the paper a key element that is proposed is the 
use of company specific methods to combat insider 
trading. A key element of this would be a company policy.  
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